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Abstract: The article aims to analyze Brexit from the perspective of the Visegrad Group countries in the context of the future of 
the European Union. Addressing this issue is important from the point of view of assessing the role of the EU for the Visegrad 
countries. The main thesis of the research is that Brexit will not lead to a reform of the EU in the coming years, which is what 
some of the Visegrad Group countries are trying to do. The article is provocative, because, during the migration crisis, the 
Visegrad Group was shown as a brake on the European integration process. After Brexit, it was considered that some of EU 
Member States could follow Great Britain and leave the EU. The article complements the scientific achievements in this field, as it 
presents the view from the country of Central and Eastern Europe.    
 





In the post-war history of integration processes in Europe, the outcome of the 
2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum was an unprecedented 
event. Until 23 June 2016, the European Union was considered a stable, predictable, and, 
most importantly, attractive entity for both its Member States and countries aspiring to 
membership. The decision of the British people and the subsequent negotiation process 
has created great uncertainty in Europe, not so much in terms of whether the EU will 
survive or not, but to what extent Brexit will affect the security of the remaining Member 
States. This is because it should be assumed that the European Union is - according to 
the supporters of the theory of realism in international relations - an instrument in the 
hands of its Member States, serving them first and foremost, and only later integration 
itself. It should not, therefore, be assumed that the EU is the greatest good for all the 
Member States. It is, of course, the greatest good that Europe has given to Europe, but it 
is not an infallible and irreplaceable entity. Only five years after the UK‟s referendum, it is 
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also difficult to put forward any unequivocal theses as to whether - for the time being - 
the single event of the UK leaving the European Union will intensify the process of 
deepening disintegration, trigger a collapse, or perhaps - on the contrary –will be an 
impulse and a generator of changes that will ultimately prove to be a salvation for 
European integration. 
The direction in which the European Union will be heading after Brexit is of 
particular importance for countries that have joined the organization relatively recently. 
Examples include Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, known in political 
science as the Visegrad Group (V4). On the one hand, these countries have gained a lot 
from their membership in the European Union, while on the other hand, in the light of 
the ongoing disintegration processes, they may lose a lot, not to mention the case of 
the collapse of the European Union, which some scholars of contemporary international 
relations write about (Kearns 2018). Indeed, one should not be indifferent to theses 
about the potentially negative consequences of Brexit. For many years, both the 
European Union and its Member States did not take seriously the possibility of a country 
leaving the EU, even despite the appearance of Article 50 in the Lisbon Treaty, allowing 
such a step. As a consequence, on 23 June 2016, everyone from the European Union as 
an organization, through its Member States, to the United Kingdom itself, was taken by 
surprise. The effects of this surprise could be seen in the chaotic negotiations to 
regulate the British exit from the EU. The EU institutions and the Member States should 
therefore draw specific lessons from the British case and prepare for possible similar 
events. 
This article aims to present the future of the European Union after Brexit from the 
perspective of the Visegrad Group. The thesis of the study is that no thorough reform of 
the EU should be expected in the coming years. This is due both to the weakness of EU 
institutions and passivity and uncertainty among the Member States as to further 
consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. The Visegrad countries are no exception in 
this regard, although due to their specificities and the contesting attitude of some of 
them, they may want to shape the intergovernmental formula of cooperation more. 
 
BREXIT: A PROBLEM FOR EUROPE AND THE VISEGRAD GROUP? 
 
Despite the fact indicated in the introduction of this article and refer to the 
element of surprise related to Brexit, in fact for experts analyzing international relations 
this surprise should not be there. While trying to analyze the British beginnings in 
continental Europe, it is not difficult to notice drastic differences between the British and 
continental approaches to the implementation and evaluation of European integration. 
For the continental Member States of the then European Communities, European 
integration was a tool of consolidation and cooperation, with a slight hint of political 
Messianism and an opportunity to build a major political project in post-war Europe. 
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The British, on the other hand, from the very beginning of the discussion on European 
integration were „next door‟. Even well before joining the Communities on 1 January 
1973, Winston Churchill spoke of Britain as the liaison between the United States and 
Europe. Later, already in conditions of membership, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
was building an independent position of the British state, in great contrast to the 
perception of the integration process by the countries of continental Europe, which 
resulted, among other things, in the so-called UK rebate. Let us also note that the 
moment the Iron Lady took office raised British Euroscepticism to a much higher level. 
Indeed, since 1979 British membership of the European Communities, or more simply 
the so-called „European question‟, has become one of the hottest topics in British 
domestic politics (Gowland et. al 2010). It was under her rule that the „British logic of 
integration‟, based on the rejection of non-economic areas of cooperation and the 
construction of supranational political structures, was shaped and later strengthened - 
lasting until 1997 (the Labour Party won the elections and Tony Blair became Prime 
Minister). In turn, already in the terms of membership of the European Union, a 
sympathetic Prime Minister David Cameron claimed that he was in favor of integration, 
but on British principles. Fundamental to these principles was the British view of 
European integration as a process. While for continental states the key action was to 
deepen it, which by its very nature results in increasing interference by European 
institutions in national legal systems, for the British one of the priority actions was to 
block it. This was because, for London, European integration was purely a tool to achieve 
a specific goal, which, however, had its limitations. One of them was the social 
dimension, illustrated, inter alia, by the scale of acceptance of ordinary Britons for 
deepening integration within the European Union and the consequences not so much 
for the residents of London, Manchester, or Liverpool, but Corby, Coalville, or Belton. 
Thus, when analyzing the British dimension of EU membership, it is impossible not to 
get the impression that it focused mainly on those areas that brought London the 
greatest profits. This refers to the common market and the resulting profit and loss 
account for the British economy. The political relations were only an enclosure of a 
strongly instrumental treatment of the EU, with a lack of strong commitment to the idea 
of creating something more - and of a political nature than just a common market for 
the benefit of London. 
The United Kingdom was the country that paved the way related to the practical 
application of Article 50. It should be noted that its content makes it the member state 
that initiates the process related to leaving the European Union, and not the other way 
round. Advocates of the theory of realism see international relations as a billiard field 
where the balls are states that move along the tracks of their national interests. In the 
context of Brexit, the UK was not only that ball but also became the rule maker in this 
integrationist game. The British have consumed the proverbial „forbidden fruit‟ of Article 
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50 and broken the taboo that European integration is a one-way process. Thus, they 
paved the way for the other Member States to their possible exits.  
For it must be remembered that the European Union of the 1990s and the 
European Union of 2021 are two completely different entities, and this is not about the 
aspect of international legal subjectivity, which was granted by the Treaty of Lisbon. The 
scratch on the glass of attractiveness, boundless trust, and treating it as the biblical 
„Promised Land‟ is getting bigger and clearer. The European Union is increasingly 
perceived as an ineffective organization, acting in the interests only of the strongest 
Member States, interfering in matters dedicated exclusively to the Member States. This, 
in turn, means that despite the continuing benefits of the integration process, national 
egoisms are beginning to revive in some EU Member States. Let us note that countries 
such as Poland, Hungary, or Italy are not far from changing their attitude towards EU 
membership, or at least changing the official narrative at the political level.  The UK has 
shown how to talk to the EU and how to do it on its terms, and ultimately how to leave 
it, without looking at EU institutions and Member States' capitals. It is, of course, difficult 
to assume that in the next few years Warsaw, Budapest, or Rome can replicate the 
British path to international independence, but they will be the focus of most observers 
of the European integration process. 
A particular group of countries that may draw on the British experience in the 
future (not necessarily in the context of a desire to leave the EU, but in the way 
European politics is practiced) is the so-called new Member States, i.e. those that joined 
the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013. The Visegrad countries occupy a special place in this 
group. These countries have a different perception of Brexit itself and its consequences 
than the UK and the so-called old Member States. The difference in the perception of 
the causes of Brexit by Western European countries and Central European countries, 
which include the „Member States‟ of the Visegrad Group, is due to at least several 
factors. The first is the different post-war historical experiences. While the UK enjoyed 
the benefits of the Marshall Plan, countries such as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
remained dependent on the Soviet Union, which precluded pro-development 
integration. The second determinant is the „seniority‟ of EU membership. 
While the UK until 2016 had experienced everything that the European 
integration process entails, the Visegrad countries are still learning the rules of the 
organization. The third determinant is the level of development of the UK versus the 
Visegrad countries. Until its membership, the UK economy was one of the largest in the 
European Union, while the Visegrad economies still had to (and still have to) catch up 
with the European leaders. This last conditionality boils down to an important reason 
why the Visegrad four decided to join the EU - a broadly understood security concept. 
The UK, unlike the Visegrad countries, has for decades regarded itself as a self-
sufficient state capable of acting independently in international relations in a way that 
enables it to exert concrete influence on other actors. From the perspective of political 
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realism, we can conclude that it is a strategically secure state, regardless of the 
circumstances in its environment. The V4 states, on the other hand, were looking for this 
security. Recalling the euphoria with which Poland entered the European Union on 1 
May 2004, one could have the impression that this event put an end to all of Poland's 
problems and difficulties as a political actor in Europe. Society was convinced that 
joining this European family would provide it with the necessary political, economic, 
social, military, and other security and that the level of prosperity would significantly 
increase. Before 2004, for Poland and the other Visegrad countries, the European Union 
was Weber's ideal type of international cooperation that would bring development and 
security to these countries. To simplify the conclusion, one can say that while the V4 
countries wanted to join the EU, the UK rather had to join the European Communities if 
it wanted to „watch over‟ the development of continental Europe. 
So why should Brexit be considered a problem for this part of Europe?  
The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union in the opinion of the 
Visegrad countries weakened and undermined the stability of the European security 
system at all levels: political, economic, social, and military. Hence, Brexit was not only 
incomprehensible for the Visegrad countries, but also came as a great surprise, 
generating changes in their foreign policy strategy. Poland was such a country in 2016. 
It will suffice at this point to quote a passage from the expose of Witold Waszczykowski, 
then Minister of Foreign Affairs, who at the beginning of 2016 said:  
We will maintain dialogue and regular consultations at various levels with 
our most important European partners - first and foremost with the United 
Kingdom, with which we share not only an understanding of many 
important elements of the European agenda but also a similar approach to 
European security problems. The shared perception of European issues 
was confirmed during my recent visit to the UK (Information 2016).  
 
As can be seen from this passage, the UK was to be the main cooperation partner 
in European politics for Poland governed by the right-wing bloc centered around Law 
and Justice. Importantly, this was not a temporary shift in foreign policy proposed by 
politicians originating from this party, but the idea and logic of the underlying European 
policy (Chojan 2016). Moreover, not only for Poland but also, for example, for the Czech 
Republic and Hungary at a certain point in their history of EU membership, the UK - as a 
proponent of the intergovernmental method of cooperation within the EU - was 
considered supportive of their aspirations to limit the deepening of the integration 
process. Hence, Brexit not only took away from them a state occasionally thinking like 
Warsaw, Prague, or Budapest but also strengthened the influence of Germany and 
France, states whose policies were often contested in all three capitals. The United 
Kingdom, as the largest country contesting the need to deepen the integration process, 
constituted a strong lobby for the Visegrad countries, but also a kind of balance against 
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an over-enthusiastic (or even unreflective) approach to the shape and future of the EU. 
Indeed, many Euro-enthusiasts underestimated the existence of a 'second, more 
contesting' group of the Member States and their opposition to the Euro-enthusiasts. 
Back in 2006, Stefan Meller, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first government of Law 
and Justice in 2005-2006, wrote that “the euphoric Euro-enthusiasm, justified to some 
extent at the time when the issue of EU membership was being decided (...) if continued 
today, would certainly pose a threat. First of all, it would weaken the will and possibilities 
of effective participation in the international competition” (Meller 2006). In light of this 
statement and attempts to translate it into post-2016 events, Brexit represented a 
weakening of international competition in the form of a counterbalance to the influence 
of Berlin and Paris. In my opinion, the difficulties and weaknesses that the European 
Union has been struggling with basically since the fiasco of the Constitutional Treaty of 
2004 are not only due to the fact of the admission of 13 new states at that time and the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, but also to the lack of the so-called critical 
Europeanism and the skillful balancing between the expectations and the possibilities 
for the influence of European institutions both in internal EU politics and in external 
relations. These issues were very often pointed out (e.g. in the context of the migration 
crisis) by both the Visegrad countries and the United Kingdom, considering them as a 
systemic problem in the integration process. 
  
WEAKNESSES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BREXIT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF  
THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES 
 
 The period of EU membership of the Visegrad Group countries is a time of great 
turbulence in international relations. The financial crisis of 2007-2011, the migration 
crisis of 2015-2019 as well as the not fully tested solutions of the Lisbon Treaty has 
undermined the foundations of the European Union in internal and external politics. In 
fact, since the aforementioned Constitutional Treaty, discussions on disintegration are 
more frequent (Majone 2014; Cianciara 2015; Vollard 2014) than on the development of 
the European integration process. Many of the EU‟s current problems, which also led to 
Brexit, are attributed to the Lisbon Treaty, which was supposed to become a new 
opening for European integration but generated more problems than its creators could 
have expected. Already at the stage of agreeing its contents, discrepancies between the 
„old‟ and „new‟ EU Member States emerged, with Poland and the Czech Republic taking 
a particularly contesting stance. Writing about the Lisbon Treaty, Jacek Pawlicki stated 
that it “has further exposed all the sins of the EU (...) There is no miracle, Europe is 
neither stronger nor does it still speak with one voice, and institutions work as they did - 
not better at all” (Pawlicki 2010). The internal weakness of the European Union, which 
increases disintegration tendencies, boils down, inter alia, to transparency in decision-
making by EU institutions. Among other things, this was discussed at the Bratislava 
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summit in September 2016 - the first informal meeting without the UK. In turn, with the 
British parliament rejecting Prime Minister May's plan for the second time, Slovak 
politicians said that the Brexit chaos is proof that the EU and its institutions should be 
reformed. In an attempt to save the UK's membership in the European Union, David 
Cameron pointed out three main weaknesses/challenges in the organization, which he 
believed should become its impulse for changes. To give the EU a chance to reflect and 
take initiative in 2013, he spoke about the problems of the Eurozone, which were the 
aftermath of the difficult times of the financial crisis. Another weakness/challenge he 
identified was the deteriorating international competitiveness of the European Union. 
He felt that the EU as an organization was stagnant and there was no progression in 
sight. However, he failed to appreciate that it was the internal frictions (also generated 
by the UK) between the EU Member States that were reflected in the international 
perception of the Union as a whole, the coherence of its foreign policy, and, above all, 
its effectiveness. This coherence should have been brought about by the 
aforementioned Treaty of Lisbon. However, this has not happened. Instead, the EU‟s 
great weakness is above all a lack of political will to strengthen it in the world. The 
Treaty of Lisbon has led to the creation of new organizational units responsible for 
external relations, thus deepening their bureaucracy, but this has had little effect on the 
effectiveness of the EU‟s international policy. For example, in the first years of the Lisbon 
Treaty, it was questioned whether, for example, the European External Action Service 
could represent a new opening in the political integration of the EU (Chojan 2012). By 
now we know that the breakthrough has not happened. The EU fails to implement the 
documents it has adopted, as exemplified by the so-called Lisbon Strategy, which was 
supposed to make the EU economy the most competitive in the world. Professor Józef 
M. Fiszer rightly wrote that: 
The world not only loses itself in European „summitology‟, but also does 
not believe in a Union that speaks with one voice, and the world's 
superpowers do business with the individual Member States of the 
European Union rather than with the Union as a whole, of which Russia is a 
vivid example. This leads to a polarization of the EU Member States and a 
feeling that their sovereignty is under threat (Fiszer 2014).  
 
As a third weakness/challenge for the EU, David Cameron identified the gap 
between the organization and the citizens. The then British Prime Minister referred to 
the lack of democratic accountability and consent, which was felt in the UK. Many 
authors have written that the European Union has lost the spirit handed down by the 
Founding Fathers, based first on people and only later on the economy and the entire 
EU-administrative apparatus. According to some experts, only “building a European civil 
society will be a guarantee for further development of the European Union and a safe 
Europe free of conflicts and wars” (Fiszer 2011). Its construction can only be possible in a 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 7, No. 2, 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                            
 148 
situation of ensuring peace, security, and prosperity. A document that attempts to 
diagnose and outline these issues is the 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS). 
This strategy is EU-centric, i.e. it focuses primarily on the interests of the European Union 
itself, its Member States, and, importantly, its citizens. Leaders of the Visegrad Group 
countries have repeatedly drawn attention to the need to listen to the voice of European 
citizens and to take action to improve their welfare and security. In a joint statement by 
leaders of June 2016, they stated: “We can never succeed unless we create a genuine 
Union of trust (...) Our citizens must see the Union stand firm on issues of common 
internal and external security interest” (Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of 
the Visegrad Group Countries: Towards Union of Trust and Action 2016).  
Nevertheless, there is no complete consensus among the Visegrad countries on 
the future shape of the European Union, as clearly resounded in 2016 during the 
Economic Forum in Krynica. While Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Viktor Orban openly spoke 
about the need for a moral counter-revolution in the EU during the 2016 Krynica 
Economic Forum, Bohuslav Sobotka and Robert Fico drew attention to completely 
different emphases, such as the increase in prosperity in the V4 countries achieved 
through EU membership.  
All the issues raised by David Cameron can be considered components of the 
intra-EU crisis. The overcoming of the crisis is not helped by the policy of some Member 
States, who are aiming to nationalize their internal and foreign policies to a greater 
extent, taking the Visegrad Group countries as an example. Some of them (Poland and 
Hungary) openly contest the need to „communitise‟ the EU‟s foreign and security policy. 
For it is difficult to imagine that Poland and Hungary - countries distrustful and reluctant 
towards the process of deepening European integration - will change their methods of 
achieving goals in foreign and security policy. The British approach to security policy 
and its implications for Central and Eastern Europe, also in the context of the Visegrad 
Group countries, is of particular importance here. The UK is well aware of the 
characteristics of the security environment, which includes, among others, the hybrid 
threat from the Russian Federation, international terrorism, threats to cybersecurity, or 
uncontrolled migration of people, which was one of the „fuels‟ of the Brexit supporters‟ 
campaign. The attitude of the British people to the policies of the Russian Federation 
deserves special emphasis. The UK National Security Strategy of November 2015 states 
that Russia has become more aggressive, authoritarian, and nationalistic, increasingly 
defining itself in opposition to the West (National Security Strategy and Strategic 
Defence and Security Review 2015. A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, 2015). 
British realism in the context of the security environment was primarily premised 
on limiting the Russian Federation‟s ability to influence the Central and Eastern 
European region. As one expert argues in the XX century, the British authorities realized 
the importance of Central and Eastern Europe for the security of Europe and the world. 
It was in their interest to have sovereign states in the region, which would be an 
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effective buffer separating Germany from Russia (Jureńczuk 2020). Thus, it would seem 
that the absence of the British in the EU would generate harm for the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, including the Visegrad Group. However, London clearly 
articulated that it is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and not the 
European Union that is for the British the mainstay of the so-called „hard security‟, which 
in turn is in line with the policies of the Visegrad countries. 
An important factor demonstrating British commitment to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization has been London's attitude to defense initiatives within the 
European Union. The UK had long thwarted EU efforts to develop its capabilities for fear 
of duplication with NATO. It saw initiatives to create a European army as detrimental to 
itself and international security in general. British distrust of EU defense initiatives was 
often based on a twofold nature, i.e. the belief that they threatened national sovereignty 
and were unlikely to work in any case. The same is true for some Visegrad states, such as 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, which see the essence of their security policy 
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The desire to take security policy out of the 
hands of the EU has been apparent before, for example in the context of the US-Poland-
Czech anti-missile shield, planned during the governments of G.W. Bush in the United 
States and Law and Justice in Poland.  
 
SCENARIOS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER BREXIT 
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP 
 
Many experts and analysts are wondering what the development of the European 
Union after Brexit might look like. This is no different in Central Europe. All theories 
presented as something certain should be considered as political fiction rather than real 
politics. Nevertheless, it is worth attempting to determine potential scenarios for the 
development of the European Union, also from the perspective of the Visegrad 
countries.  
 
Brexit as the Beginning of the End of the Lisbon European Union 
 
It is an open secret that some of the Visegrad countries are not happy with the 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty (although they agreed to it) because, on the one hand, 
they grant too much power to the EU institutions and, on the other hand, they restrict 
the freedom of the Member States.  
The fundamental question that should therefore be put to the EU‟s political elite 
is what lessons have been learned from the Brexit referendum, the negotiations, and, 
ultimately, UK‟s final exit from the EU? Is the Lisbon EU not too far away from the Nice 
EU, which the V4 countries joined in 2004? While the post-Lisbon EU is heading in the 
direction of creeping federalism, Brexit, for example, for Hungary and Poland, may 
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become a fuel for expanding Euroscepticism and strengthening rhetoric based on 
sovereignty and, to put it bluntly, renationalizing their foreign policies, but not only 
theirs. These trends may also be reinforced by Italy's stance, and their outcome will be 
reflected in proposals for treaty reforms that strengthen the intergovernmental formula 
for cooperation. The seed of such tendencies was the Morawiecki-Orban-Salvini 
meeting in April 2021 in Budapest. 
 
Brexit as Stagnation and Uncertainty 
 
The second possible scenario is that of stagnation, that is to say, of no change in 
the logic of European policy and the EU institutions coming into conflict with some of 
the Member States, including the Visegrad countries, for example in the area of the rule 
of law, as is the case with Poland and Hungary. The Lisbon European Union is interfering 
very strongly in the internal policies of Member States.  
The buckle that binds and protects the integration process from disintegration 
will be, on the one hand, the European Reconstruction Fund, established to combat the 
consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, whose great beneficiaries will be the V4 
countries led by Poland, and on the other hand, the possibility of enlarging the EU with 
new countries from the Western Balkans. The thesis that Brexit may lead to the 
stagnation of the integration process or even throw it into an undefined dimension is 
confirmed, for example, in the document presented by the European Commission in 
2017. The White Paper on the future of the EU contained 5 scenarios for its 
development, covering loosening integration, a multi-speed EU, as well a federation.  
European Commission officials have said they see its contents as „the birth 
certificate of the EU of 27‟. Meanwhile, as we look at the outcome of the post-Brexit 
changes so far, they are not even at the stage of planning a new family, let alone issuing 
birth certificates. What has happened in the EU is that, with the significant participation 
of the V4 countries, the concept of a multi-speed Europe has been strengthened, and its 
further development will not be beneficial in particular to countries such as Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary.  
This scenario assumes the establishment of groups of states that could form 
„coalitions of the willing‟ to cooperate more closely in certain areas, such as defense 
policy, internal security, taxation, or social affairs, and thus carry out a sectoral 
deepening of European integration. While deepening integration is not a major problem 
for the Slovaks, it is for the other three countries. It is hard to deny at this point that 
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Brexit as an Inspiration for Change 
 
It seems that the V4 countries agree on the need to introduce systemic changes 
in the European Union. They differ, however, in their conceptualization and expectations, 
especially in the national dimension. Paradoxically, of all the V4 states, Slovakia is closest 
to the EU mainstream and furthest from the Visegrad contestation. Nevertheless, voices 
about the need for reform and change were also heard from Bratislava. Speaking about 
the changing scenario, one should go back to D. Cameron‟s statement in 2013. He drew 
attention to the fundamental problems of the European Union, but he considered them 
not from the point of view of the EU as an international organization, but from the 
perspective of a member state and the consequences related to further „drifting‟ of the 
integration process. Reversing the process of European integration in this context 
referred to the need for its modification in terms of the expectations of the member 
state, while Article 50 TEU was the legal instrument for its practical implementation. It, 
therefore, seems that while Brexit will inspire changes in the way the EU functions, it will 
be forced from the perspective of the strength of Article 50 TEU, rather than a rational 
desire for changes in European institutions. The Union, wishing to at least maintain its 
position - under this scenario - cannot allow another „exit‟. It is an open question and an 
issue for another academic study to change the treaty norms in a way that would allow 
the EU institutions to exclude Member States - e.g. following the example of Article 6 of 
the UN Charter. From the perspective of 2021, however, this seems to be a political 
dream rather than a political reality. Nevertheless, in 1993 when the Maastricht Treaty 




It is extremely difficult to write about the European Union after Brexit just one 
year after its formal entry into force. However, it is worth discussing and reflecting on 
possible scenarios. And the fact of having an unruly member state does not always have 
to mean that the integration process is hampered. Just as having the Visegrad countries 
with experience of the Soviet occupation and difficult history in its ranks allows the 
European Union to look at European issues with more distance and sensitivity, it is also 
important to have such „politically difficult‟ countries as the United Kingdom in its 
structure. David Cameron, to win the elections in the UK, started to play a very 
dangerous game driven by the wave of Euroscepticism and anti-EU sentiments among 
the British people, which ultimately outgrew him and ended up in the biggest 
institutional crisis in the post-war history of European integration.  
Looking at the pace at which EU leaders are attempting to change the EU and 
considering the international and economic conditions caused by the Covid-19 
pandemic, it is difficult to expect thorough and drastic reforms. It seems, therefore, that 
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the scenario of stagnation of the European project is the most realistic and, 
paradoxically, the safest for the difficult post-Covid times. And even the Visegrad 
countries, so skeptical for some and realistic for others, are not able to present an 
alternative or even a proposal to modify the European project. Over the last 5 years, 
none of the four Visegrad capitals has presented its vision of the development of 
European integration. Pointing out changes and blaming Germany and France is 
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